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<title>Oxford Journal of Legal Studies - current issue</title>
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<prism:eIssn>1464-3820</prism:eIssn>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>Summer 2008</prism:coverDisplayDate>
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<item rdf:about="http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/28/2/201?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Corporate Governance and the Importance of Macroeconomic Context]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/28/2/201?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article seeks to bring a focus to the significance of trade and finance in corporate governance outcomes. It explores the theoretical and historical link between micro-economic-level firm structure and macro-economic institutions such as trade and finance. The more open the economy, it argues, the more difficult it is in the long run to sustain an insider model. It then argues that changes in interdependent aspects of macro-economic policy in the UK and the US&mdash;primarily trade liberalization and the end of capital controls&mdash;combined with the presence of developed capital markets and a self-regulatory ethos, allowed institutional investors to refocus the market-level rules on shareholders despite the managerial bias of their legal systems, and enabled the emergence of the outsider shareholder-oriented systems present there today. The article then argues that core insider systems such as those in Germany and France operated with different financing arrangements which meant that they were less susceptible to immediate change. However, in the long run global economic conditions have continued to push shareholder-oriented norms on insider systems. The article concludes that if these conditions persist, then governments will lose, or may indeed already have lost, sovereignty with regard to choice of corporate governance system.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dignam, A., Galanis, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-23</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqn009</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Corporate Governance and the Importance of Macroeconomic Context]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>28</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>243</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>201</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/28/2/245?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[What Right Does Unjust Enrichment Law Protect?]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/28/2/245?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article offers an understanding of the normative basis of unjust enrichment. It begins by considering whether the right at stake in cases of unjust enrichment fits within a Kantian conception of right that treats free agency as the sole aspect of the person commanding respect. It argues that it does not because, in cases of unjust enrichment, recovery does not depend on finding a violation of the plaintiff's bare freedom to choose. The article then argues that unjust enrichment vindicates the plaintiff's right of self-determination&mdash;the realization of the capacity to live from self-chosen ends&mdash;when the laws of property and contract threaten to undermine it. This resolves the puzzles of unjust enrichment law that remain mysterious on other accounts, such as how the plaintiff can have a right to recovery even though property has been effectively transferred to the defendant, why the plaintiff may recover even though the defendant has been purely passive and has committed no wrong, and why unjust enrichment fails to exhibit the structure of corrective justice.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nadler, J. M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-23</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqn011</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[What Right Does Unjust Enrichment Law Protect?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>28</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>275</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>245</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/28/2/277?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Beyond the Bottom Line: the Theoretical Aims of Moral Theorizing]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/28/2/277?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Moral theory is no substitute for virtue, but virtue is no substitute for moral theory. Many critics of moral theory, with Richard Posner being one prominent recent example, complain that moral theory is too abstract, that it cannot generally be used to derive particular rights and wrongs, and that it does not improve people's characters. Posner complains that it is thus of no use to legal theorists. This article defends moral theory, and to some degree, philosophical inquiry in general, against such pragmatic complaints. I argue that the primary goal of moral theorizing is not pragmatic, but theoretical. Moral theory aims at explanation, at answering certain kinds of questions about morality. Moral theory is meant to deepen our insight into morality but, to count as deepening our insight, it need not provide a formula for calculating what to do in a particular circumstance, nor must it make us more virtuous. I provide an account of the scope and nature of explanation provided by moral theory as well as an account of why such explanations can be worth having, even if they were to have few pragmatic consequences.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brennan, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-23</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqn006</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Beyond the Bottom Line: the Theoretical Aims of Moral Theorizing]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>28</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>296</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>277</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/28/2/297?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Respecting the Living Means Respecting the Dead too]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/28/2/297?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Why should we respect the wishes which individuals may have about how their body is treated after death? Reflecting on how and why the law respects the bodies of the living, we argue that we must also respect the &lsquo;dead&rsquo;. We contest the relevance of the argument &lsquo;the dead have no interests&rsquo;, rather we think that the pertinent argument is &lsquo;the living have interests in what happens to their dead bodies&rsquo;. And, we advance arguments why we should also respect the wishes of the relatives of the deceased regarding what happens to the bodies of their loved ones. In our analysis, we use objections to organ and tissue donation for conscientious reasons (often presented as religious reasons) to show why the living can have interests in their dead bodies, and those of their dead relatives, and why these interests should be respected.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[McGuinness, S., Brazier, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-23</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqn005</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Respecting the Living Means Respecting the Dead too]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>28</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>316</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>297</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[How to do Things with Security Post 9/11]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/28/2/317?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Discourses and the ideas, perceptions and templates upon which they are based exert a powerful influence on law-making, push policy-making in a precise direction and determine operational action and outcomes. British counterterrorist law and policy post 9/11 is heavily mediated through a conceptual filter that evokes a siege mode of democracy, which deliberately displaces the traditional rights-based model, and a security narrative based on a double asymmetry. By blending a discursive theoretical approach with an institutionalist perspective, the discussion examines the siege mode of democracy and its implications and the double asymmetry underpinning the Government's framing of the threat and of the means to counter it. Both features of the Government's security discourse are critical in explaining not only British counter-terrorist legislation and policy evolution in the 21st century and the controversial operation &lsquo;Kratos&rsquo; adopted by ACPO in 2002, but also their official depiction as necessary, and singular, responses to some structured necessity and the associated logic of &lsquo;no alternative&rsquo;.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kostakopoulou, D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-23</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqn010</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[How to do Things with Security Post 9/11]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>28</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>342</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>317</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/28/2/343?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Paradox of Constitutionalism or the Potential of Constitutional Theory?]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/28/2/343?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Galligan, D. J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-23</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqn007</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Paradox of Constitutionalism or the Potential of Constitutional Theory?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>28</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>367</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>343</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Review Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[Comparative Criminal Justice Goes Global ]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/28/2/369?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Roberts, P.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-23</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqn008</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Comparative Criminal Justice Goes Global ]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>28</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>391</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>369</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Review Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[Rights, Reductionism and Tort Law]]></title>
<link>http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/28/2/393?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Murphy, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-06-23</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/ojls/gqn004</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Rights, Reductionism and Tort Law]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>28</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>407</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-01-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>393</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Review Articles</prism:section>
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